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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1233 
_____________ 
  
IN RE: TERRY E. SILVA, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-16-mc-00155) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, MCKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 20, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Terry Elizabeth Silva appeals her three-year suspension from the 
practice of law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, pursuant to its Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.6 II.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
I 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
In 2016, the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board concluded that Silva had violated 
the Rules of Professional Conduct in her representation of a client in a personal injury 
action against Walmart.  The violations included failure to communicate, commingling of 
client funds, failure to account for settlement funds, failure to maintain required records, 
conversion of funds, and dishonest conduct.   
On June 14, 2016, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the Board’s 
recommendation to suspend Silva from the practice of law for three years.  Silva 
subsequently notified the District Court of the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania and of her wish to contest the imposition of reciprocal discipline.  After 
holding a hearing and reviewing written submissions, a three-judge panel of the District 
Court recommended the imposition of a reciprocal three-year suspension.  The District 
Court adopted the recommendation. 
II 
The District Court “has the inherent authority to set requirements for admission to 
its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.”  In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 231 
(3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  In reciprocal disciplinary proceedings, the District 
Court independently reviews the state record “for consistency with the requirements of 
due process, adequacy of proof and absence of any indication that imposing discipline 
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would result in grave injustice.”  Id. (quoting In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 
1994)).  The attorney subject to discipline bears the burden of demonstrating “by clear 
and convincing evidence” the presence of a serious infirmity in the state proceeding.  Id. 
at 232 (quoting In re Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 724–25 (9th Cir. 2002)).  “We review 
district courts’ decisions regarding the regulation of attorneys who appear before them for 
abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 229 (citation omitted).  
Silva presents a variety of arguments as to why the District Court abused its 
discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline.1  She chiefly argues that the District Court 
failed to conduct an independent review, thus depriving her of due process.  She contends 
that the lack of independence is evidenced by the District Court’s (1) failure to apply 
federal law; (2) misapplication of “state law on parole [sic] evidence, legal charging liens 
and co-clients;” and (3) resting “on an infirm record for failure of actual and proper 
credibility of findings.”  App. 4.   
In undertaking our “extremely limited” review, we find Silva’s arguments 
unpersuasive.  Surrick, 338 F.3d at 231 (citation omitted).  She made many of the same 
arguments before the District Court, which addressed and dismissed them in its Report 
and Recommendation.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusions.  Her first two 
arguments—that the District Court should have applied federal law regarding fee disputes 
or state law on charging liens and co-clients—rest on the premise that the original fee 
                                              
1 Although we granted Silva’s motion to file an overlength brief for the sake of 
expediency, we note that this case does not present any “extraordinary circumstances” 
warranting such additional language, nor did such language aid in our review.   
4 
 
arrangement was subsequently modified.2  However, Silva failed to present to the Board 
clear and convincing evidence of any contract modification.  Silva’s third argument rests 
on her belief that the chief witness against her, her client’s son and former client, lacked 
credibility.  We agree with the District Court that the Board’s “failure to make specific 
factual findings in support of its determination that [client’s son] was credible” did not 
diminish his credibility or result in an “infirmity of proof.”  App. 16. 
We are satisfied that the District Court’s examination of the record, exhibits, and 
witnesses during Silva’s hearing comported with the requirements of due process and 
constituted an independent review of the state record.  We conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline. 
III 
Thus, we will affirm. 
                                              
2 Silva’s client in the personal injury action against Walmart was the mother of a 
former client, who had an outstanding bill resulting from Silva’s representation of the son 
in a previous matter. Silva alleges that the fee agreement in the personal injury action was 
modified to add the former client as a co-client, thereby allowing Silva to withhold a 
portion of the Walmart settlement in satisfaction of the allegedly unpaid fees from the 
previous matter.  
